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I. INTRODUCING OLIVER V. NCAA
“It’s not an easy job, picking nits this tiny, but nobody is up to the
task like the NCAA.”
—Sports Columnist, Rick Reilly1
Nit-picking occurs every day. Taxes must be filed a certain way.
Barcodes must be wrinkle-free when swiping them through the selfcheckout line. And DMV clerks will send you home without hesitation for
not bringing enough forms of identification.
As noted sports columnist Rick Reilly points out, the National
†
“Veil of Amateurism” is a phrase coined by Amy Christian McCormick & Robert A. McCormick
in their article, The Emperor’s New Clothes: Lifting the NCAA’s Veil of Amateurism, 45 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 495 (2008).
∗ The author is an associate attorney at Huddleston Bolen LLP in Huntington, West Virginia, a
2009 Order of the Coif graduate of the West Virginia University College of Law, and a 2004 summa cum
laude graduate from the W. Page Pitt School of Journalism and Mass Communications at Marshall
University. Special thanks to Professor andré douglas pond cummings for his unending encouragement,
to my wife, Tiffany, the hardest worker I know, and to the editors of the University of Dayton Law
Review for their efforts in publishing this Article. This Article is dedicated to my mother, Sandy, who
taught me that one’s heart is more important than one’s mind.
1
Rick Reilly, Corrupting Our Utes, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 11, 2003, at 154, available at
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/inside_game/magazine/life_of_reilly/ (discussing NCAA violations
allegedly committed by former Utah basketball coach Rick Majerus, which included buying a player
dinner from a deli and watching fifteen minutes of a pickup basketball game he was not supposed to
watch).
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Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”)2 is no different. Through its
427-page manual, the NCAA regulates just about everything.3 For instance,
if a student-athlete plays in an unauthorized five-on-five basketball
tournament, he or she runs the risk of being suspended by the NCAA.4 One
former college baseball player was even told his career was over after
writing a book about how he survived brain cancer.5 The reason? “[H]is
name was attached to a ‘corporate product.’”6
The case of Andrew “Andy” Oliver is no different. Just hours
before he was to take the mound in Oklahoma State’s regional baseball
championship game, Oliver was “‘interrogated’” and declared ineligible.7
The accusation? Violation of NCAA Bylaw 12.3.2.1, which prohibits
lawyers from being present during contract negotiations with a professional
organization if the student-athlete wishes to preserve his or her collegiate
eligibility while deciding between accepting a professional contract or
continuing as an amateur athlete.8 As a general rule, the NCAA does not
allow players to hire (orally or in writing) an agent “for the purpose of
marketing his or her athletics ability or reputation in that sport.”9 If an
agent10 is hired, the athlete is deemed ineligible.11 NCAA regulations do
provide for an attorney exception by allowing professional prospects to
secure advice from lawyers concerning professional sports contracts, but the
2
The NCAA is a voluntary collegiate athletic organization formed to “maintain intercollegiate
athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the student
body and, by so doing, retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and
professional sports.” NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2008-2009 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL,
Const. art. 1.3.1 (2008), available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/Uploads/PDF/Division_1_
Manual_2008-09e9e568a1-c269-4423-9ca5-16d6827c16bc.pdf [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL].
3
See id.; see also T. Matthew Lockhart, The NCAA Should Adopt a Uniform Student-Athlete
Discipline Policy, 16 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 119, 123 (2009). The Author would like to note that in his
previous article, The NCAA Should Adopt a Uniform Student-Athlete Discipline Policy, he advocates that
the NCAA should enact legislation to deal with troubled athletes. Despite this call for the NCAA to
exercise more power, this Author believes the NCAA regulates arbitrarily in other areas.
4
Heather A. Dinch, Two Terps Suspended for Opener; Gist, Milbourne to Sit Because They Played
in Unapproved Event; College Basketball Preview, THE BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 7, 2007, at 3E. Two
University of Maryland basketball players were suspended for one game by the NCAA for participating
in an unsanctioned five-on-five basketball tournament, which is in violation of NCAA bylaw 14.7.2.
5
Jeremy Bloom, Show Us the Money, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2003, at A21 (referring to the book, You
Don’t Know Where I’ve Been, written by former University of Oklahoma third baseman Aaron Adair).
As Adair wrote on his web site, “I have surrived [sic] brain cancer, radiation, a mysterious stomach
disease, and numerous other situations, physcial [sic] and emotional. The good Lord wants me to help
you with your situation. I was an athlete at the University of Oklahoma until I wrote a book and got it
published this past spring. My book ‘You Don’t Know Where I’ve Been’ prohibited me from playing
since I was making money off of it.” Changing Lives Forever, http://www.aaronadair.com (last visited
Feb. 23, 2010).
6
Bloom, supra note 5, at A21.
7
Liz Mullen, Pitcher’s Father, Lawyer Decry Tactics of NCAA, Oklahoma St., STREET & SMITH’S
SPORTSBUSINESS JOURNAL, July 21, 2008, at 14, available at http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/
article/59593 [hereinafter Decry Tactics].
8
Id.; NCAA MANUAL, supra note 2, Bylaw 12.3.2.1, at 69. Under NCAA regulations, lawyers can
be hired to review a proposed contract. This bylaw, however, revokes a student-athlete’s eligibility if the
lawyer negotiates the contract or is present during the negotiation of the contract. Id.
9
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 2, Bylaw 12.3.1, at 68.
10
An “agent” here refers to any individual, including, but not limited to, a lawyer, who markets a
person’s athletics ability or reputation in that sport.
11
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 2, Bylaw 12.3.1, at 68.
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lawyer may not be present during the actual negotiation or the studentathlete will compromise his or her eligibility.12 To support these rules, the
NCAA stands behind its goal of “retain[ing] a clear line of demarcation
between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.”13
Following Oliver’s senior year of high school in 2006, he was
drafted in the seventeenth round of the Major League Baseball Amateur
Draft by the Minnesota Twins. Near the end of the summer, a representative
of the Twins came to the Oliver home to discuss a contract offer.14 Present
at the visit was Oliver’s lawyer, Tim Baratta, who was retained to act as his
attorney and sports advisor.15 Mr. Barratta’s presence at the Oliver home
during contract negotiations triggered the NCAA violation.16 When the
NCAA and Oklahoma State learned of this, Oliver was ruled ineligible to
participate in college athletics.17 In response, Oliver filed a lawsuit asking
an Ohio court of common pleas18 to, among other specific claims, declare
Bylaws 12.3.2.1 and 19.719 arbitrary and capricious and to enter a permanent
injunction to allow him to participate in collegiate athletics again.20 Ohio
Common Pleas Judge Tygh M. Tone granted Oliver’s request against the

12

NCAA MANUAL, supra note 2, Bylaws 12.3.2 and 12.3.2.1, at 69.
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 2, Const. art. 1.3.1, at 1.
14
First Amended Complaint ¶ 23, Oliver v. NCAA, No. 2008-CV-0762 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl., Dec. 17,
2008) (on file with author) [hereinafter Oliver Complaint].
15
Id. ¶ 11.
16
Mr. Barratta also allegedly spoke with a Twins representative on the phone. Letter from Scott
Williams, Assoc. Athletic Dir., Okla. State Univ., to Jennifer Henderson, Dir. of Membership
Servs./Student-Athlete Reinstatement, NCAA (Oct. 24, 2008) (on file with author) [hereinafter Williams
Letter to NCAA].
17
Liz Mullen, OSU P Andy Oliver Files Suit Against NCAA, Former Advisor, STREET & SMITH’S
SPORTSBUSINESS DAILY, July 2, 2008, available at https://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/article/122046
[hereinafter Oliver Files Suit]. When a member institution of the NCAA discovers that a player has
violated NCAA rules, the institution must declare the student-athlete ineligible for intercollegiate
competition. The institution can ask for reinstatement of a student-athlete’s eligibility by sending a
request to the NCAA. NCAA, Overview of NCAA Bylaws Governing Athlete Agents, (2010), http://
www.ncaa.org/wps/portal/ncaahome?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/ncaa/ncaa/legislation+and+govern
ance/eligibility+and+recruiting/agents+and+amateurism/uaaa/overview.html.
Working hand-in-hand
with the NCAA puts institutions in tough spots, as was the case in Andrew Oliver’s situation. When the
NCAA issued a public statement that Oklahoma State, not the NCAA, was responsible for the
determination of Oliver’s ineligibility, Oklahoma State athletic director, Mike Holder, wrote the NCAA a
forceful letter. “[T]his release shifted all blame to the University when the NCAA initiated the
investigation into this matter.” Letter from Mike Holder, Athletic Dir., Okla. State Univ., to C. Dennis
Cryder, Sr. Vice President of Branding and Commc’ns, NCAA (July 23, 2008) (on file with author).
18
Oliver, an Erie County, Ohio, resident, obtained jurisdiction in Ohio against the NCAA because it
does business in Ohio and has members domiciled in Ohio. Oliver Complaint, supra note 14, ¶¶ 1-2. As
an unincorporated association, the NCAA is a citizen of every state in which it has a member. So for the
NCAA, that means all fifty states. See id.
19
Under current NCAA rules, if a student-athlete successfully obtains a restraining order or
injunction against his or her institution or the NCAA that is ultimately invalidated, the institution faces
stiff penalties if it allowed the student-athlete to participate in athletic competition as a result of the initial
restraining order or injunction. This is the “Restitution Rule” that encompasses Bylaw 19.7. For an indepth discussion of Bylaw 19.7, see infra Part II.A.2 and note 57.
20
Oliver Complaint, supra note 14, ¶¶ 95-106. Oliver also sued the NCAA for breach of contract
and tortious interference with contract. Id. ¶ 99.
13
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backdrop of years of judicial deference toward the NCAA.21
As expected, the NCAA was not about to let this decision have
nationwide implications. Just before the parties’ October 19, 2009, trial date
for Oliver’s breach of contract and tortious interference with contract
claims,22 the NCAA paid Andy Oliver $750,000 to settle the lawsuit. By
doing this, Judge Tone’s Order was vacated, thereby allowing the NCAA to
continue to enforce its regulations.23 Before the settlement, the NCAA was
adamant about its position that Bylaws 12.3.2.1 and 19.7 are not arbitrary
and capricious in light of the potential impact of the Oliver decision.24 The
NCAA feared the lower court’s decision would “‘transform this case into a
national “class action” affecting the rights of over 1,200 [NCAA] member
institutions and hundreds of thousands of student-athletes,’” but it continued
advising student-athletes that the judge’s ruling is narrow and the noattorney negotiation rule still applies.25 However, in a post-decision Order

21
Oliver v. NCAA, 920 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2009); see also Part II.B.1 infra, and
Matthew J. Mitten & Timothy Davis, Athlete Eligibility Requirements and Legal Protection of Sports
Participation Opportunities, 8 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 71, 119 (2008) (describing years of judicial
deference toward the NCAA).
22
Katie Thomas, Appeals Court Blocks N.C.A.A. Rule Barring Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2009,
at B16 [hereinafter Appeals Court Blocks NCAA] (an appeal at this stage was premature because the
Oliver case was not yet complete, according to a ruling from the Ohio Court of Appeals).
23
Liz Mullen, NCAA: We’ll Still Enforce Rule That Drew Suit, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTSBUSINESS
JOURNAL, Oct. 19, 2009, at 28, available at http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/article/63861
[hereinafter Still Enforce Rule].
24
See Appeals Court Blocks NCAA, supra note 22. An NCAA spokesman said the NCAA was
“‘disappointed that we have to wait to appeal, but we still intend to do so.’” Id.
25
Id. The NCAA characterized the “sheer scope of the trial Court’s order” as “no less than
breathtaking.” Defendant NCAA’s Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss at 11,
Oliver v. NCAA, No. E-09-007 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2009) (on file with author) [hereinafter NCAA’s
Opposition]; see also Plaintiff’s Notice of Additional Evidence in Support of his Supplemental Motion
for Contempt with Request for Evidentiary Hearing at 23, Oliver v. NCAA, No. 2008-CV-0762 (Ohio
Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 12, 2009) (on file with author) (quoting a May 11, 2009 memo from the NCAA to
student-athletes).

Am I permitted to have an advisor?
YES, but only if your advisor acts in accordance with NCAA agent
legislation. That legislation allows you and your parents to receive advice from a
lawyer concerning a proposed professional sports contract, provided that
individual does not represent you directly in negotiating the contract. It also allows
you to seek advice and counsel from an individual (even a nonlawyer agent), so
long as that individual does not market you to or have direct communications, on
your behalf, with MLB clubs. The most important point to remember is that it is
impermissible for you to allow your advisor to talk to clubs about you. If you do,
the advisor will be considered an agent and you will have jeopardized your
eligibility at NCAA schools. [Note: February 12, 2009, in a case entitled Oliver v.
NCAA, an Ohio trial-court judge held Bylaw 12.3.2.1 was invalid under Ohio law
and as a result a student-athlete was not ineligible if an attorney is present during
discussions of a contract offer with a professional team. The NCAA intends to
appeal the decision in the Oliver case.]
…
Is my advisor allowed to speak with teams on my behalf?
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issued by Judge Tone, the NCAA was warned the rule was void nationwide, and any attempt to enforce it upon student-athletes could result in
contempt of court.26 Thus, the NCAA was left with two options—hope for
success upon appeal or settle the case and vacate the Order. It chose the
latter.
Today, the NCAA continues to enforce Bylaw 12.3.2.1. However,
the fight over the legality of the bylaw is not over as some in the legal
community believe the Oliver case opened the door for future challenges to
NCAA bylaws by student-athletes.27 “‘Another court can come to exactly
the same conclusion and hold the policy unlawful, and the fact that the
decision has been vacated does not make its reasoning any less persuasive,’”
sports attorney Jeffrey Kessler told Street & Smith’s SportsBusiness
Journal.28
Thus, the purpose of this Article is to navigate the Oliver v. NCAA
decision in hopes of predicting what the future will hold for athletes
challenging the NCAA. As one can imagine, this case is like any other
lawsuit. It is riddled with factual sidebars,29 many of which matter a great
deal to the parties involved. However, the idea of this Article is not to get
tangled in minutiae.30 For the sake of keeping the discussion in this Article
about the NCAA regulations and legal decisions in Oliver v. NCAA and the
long-term legal impact of this case, the author is forced to keep the facts and
NO. You cannot allow your advisor to have conversations with MLB
clubs on your behalf. This means that your advisor cannot discuss your draft status
with any club. Your advisor cannot discuss your signability with any club. You
advisor [sic] cannot arrange tryouts for you with any club. Your advisor cannot
speak with any club on your behalf for any reason. Also, keep in mind that it is
likely that you will have to accept responsibility for the actions your advisor takes
on your behalf. It is not sufficient to simply state that you did not know what your
advisor had done for you.
Id.
Judgment Entry at 2, Oliver v. NCAA, No. 2008-CV-0762, (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. May 6, 2009) (on
file with author) [hereinafter Contempt Order].
26

Contrary to Defendant's rhetoric, the February entry did not presume to void an
NCAA rule, it did void an NCAA rule. In that respect, discussions of how to
proceed without Bylaw 12.3.2.1 should be discussed by the NCAA and its member
institutions. Make no mistake, however, that wherever the NCAA is located, the
ruling of this Court should be currently maintained and Bylaw 12.3.2.1 is void, not
presumed void, until and unless an appellate review would determine otherwise.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
Still Enforce Rule, supra note 23.
Id.
29
“Factual sidebars” in this context means that just like any lawsuit, this one has many background
facts, such as who reported Oliver to the NCAA, why they reported him, and so on. These facts are
important to the parties, but add little to the analysis of the future legal implications of the Oliver v.
NCAA decision.
30
As United States District Court Judge Jack Zouhary wrote, “[t]his case is reminiscent of an Okie
tornado which gathers speed and heads in one direction, only to abruptly make a turn and speed toward
another target.” Order, Oliver v. Baratta, No. 3:08-CV-1734, (N. D. Ohio Nov. 17, 2008) (on file with
author).
27
28
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legal procedure of the case straightforward.
Now that the basic factual backdrop has been presented, this Article
will move into Part II, which discusses the NCAA regulations at issue and
examines Andrew Oliver’s claims in light of years of judicial deference to
the NCAA. Against this backdrop, the Oliver v. NCAA decision will be
analyzed, as it opened up the possibility that NCAA bylaws can be attacked
under a third-party contract theory.
Finally, in Part III of this Article, the focus will turn to the future.
In light of the settlement and Judge Tone’s persuasive reasoning, what
happens next?31 Can amateur athletes, mainly baseball players, hire
attorneys to negotiate professional contracts? And more importantly will
Oliver v. NCAA help chip away the years of judicial deference courts have
provided the NCAA?
II. EXAMINING THE ANDREW OLIVER STORY
“‘The NCAA tries to keep these kids down with a big thumb while
they take in revenues of $600M a year as a tax exempt entity.’”
—Andrew Oliver’s Attorney, Richard Johnson32
To appreciate the importance of the Oliver v. NCAA decision, it is
critical to understand the bylaws at issue. For organizational purposes, this
Part of the Article will first describe the NCAA bylaws at play, thereby
making it easier to follow the legal arguments and the ultimate decision by
the Erie County Court of Common Pleas.
A. NCAA Regulations: “Who is the NCAA Trying to Protect?”
“When looking at these regulations, the unavoidable question
arises: who is the NCAA trying to protect?”
—Law Professor, Richard Karcher33
This important question provides a starting point when analyzing
the regulations at issue in Oliver v. NCAA—Bylaws 12.3.2.1 and 19.7.

31
Before the settlement, the NCAA asked itself this very question. “The trial court’s ruling has left
this critical question open to debate and speculation among NCAA members, their hundreds of thousands
of student-athletes and potential student-athletes, as well as the national media. . . . Left to answer
questions the trial court itself refused to clarify (will the Order effect ‘Ohio members, Oklahoma
members, all institutions?’), the NCAA literally has no effective way to guide its members.” NCAA’s
Opposition, supra note 25, at 11.
32
Liz Mullen, Judge Voids NCAA Ban on Lawyers Aiding in Pro Contract Talks, STREET &
SMITH’S SPORTSBUSINESS DAILY, Mar. 9, 2009, at 12, available at http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/
article/127737.
33
Richard T. Karcher, The NCAA’s Regulations Related to the Use of Agents in the Sport of
Baseball: Are the Rules Detrimental to the Best Interest of the Amateur Athlete?, 7 VAND. J. ENT. L. &
PRAC. 215, 215 (2005) (discussing what is known as the NCAA’s “no-agent” rule).
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1. NCAA Bylaw 12.3.2.134
Florida Coastal School of Law Professor Richard Karcher was a
visionary. His 2005 article, The NCAA’s Regulations Related to the Use of
Agents in the Sport of Baseball: Are the Rules Detrimental to the Best
Interest of the Amateur Athlete?, presented the basic question that would be
at the center of Oliver v. NCAA four years later: “[W]ho is the NCAA trying
to protect?”35 From the perspective of the NCAA, the question is easy and
absolute: the student-athlete. The NCAA’s intention for many of the
regulations in its bulky manual is to “retain a clear line of demarcation
between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.”36 However,
intentions do not always translate to the actual intended results.
For all sports, the NCAA has a general policy prohibiting the use of
agents37: “An individual shall be ineligible for participation in an
intercollegiate sport if he or she ever has agreed (orally or in writing) to be
represented by an agent for the purpose of marketing his or her athletics
ability or reputation in that sport.”38
If a player enters into an agreement for representation in future
professional sports negotiations, he or she will be deemed ineligible.39
Moreover, players also risk the possibility of being ruled ineligible if they
accept benefits from an agent.40 This set of regulations has become known
as the “no-agent” rule, a rule widely discussed in academic circles.41 The
implication of this rule is that a student-athlete may not hire an agent until
(1) he or she has exhausted his or her eligibility, or (2) he or she is ready to
forgo his or her remaining eligibility. While the intention is to protect the
student-athlete, the effect reaches further. As was written in the Harvard
Law Review, the no-agent rule “restrain[s] player mobility by discouraging
athletes from testing the professional players’ markets before their college
eligibility expires.”42
34

12.3.2.1 Presence of a Lawyer at Negotiations. A lawyer may not be present
during discussions of a contract offer with a professional organization or have any
direct contact (in person, by telephone or by mail) with a professional sports
organization on behalf of the individual. A lawyer’s presence during such
discussions is considered representation by an agent.
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 2, Bylaw 12.3.2.1, at 69.
See Karcher, supra note 33, at 215.
36
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 2, Const. art. 1.3.1, at 1.
37
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 2, Bylaw 12.3, at 68 (Use of Agents section).
38
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 2, Bylaw 12.3.1, at 68 (General Rule).
39
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 2, Bylaw 12.3.1.1, at 69 (Representation for Future Negotiations).
40
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 2, Bylaw 12.3.1.2, at 69 (Benefits from Prospective Agents).
41
See generally Karcher, supra note 33; Thomas R. Kobin, The National Collegiate Athlete
Association’s No Agent and No Draft Rules: The Realities of Collegiate Sports Are Forcing Change, 4
SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 483 (1994); Note, Sherman Act Invalidation of the NCAA Amateurism Rules,
105 HARV. L. REV. 1299 (1992); Jan Stiglitz, NCAA-Based Agent Regulation: Who Are We Protecting,
67 N.D. L. REV. 215 (1991).
42
Note, supra note 41, at 1300.
35
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There is one small exception to the no-agent rule, and it comes into
play in Oliver v. NCAA. Bylaw 12.3.2, titled Legal Counsel, allows players
to secure “advice from a lawyer concerning a proposed professional sports
contract.”43 However, there is one important caveat: if the athlete wishes to
preserve his or her college eligibility while considering a professional
contract, the lawyer may not represent the individual in negotiations for
such a contract (or even be present during negotiations).44 And the NCAA
defines the word negotiate with broad overtones:
A lawyer may not be present during discussions of a
contract offer with a professional organization or have any
direct contact (in person, by telephone or by mail) with a
professional sports organization on behalf of the individual.
A lawyer’s presence during such discussion is considered
representation by an agent.45
This exception is unique to baseball, as opposed to basketball and
football, for two key reasons. First, unlike the National Basketball
Association and National Football League drafts, the Major League Baseball
draft occurs during the college season.46 And unlike the NBA or NFL,
college baseball players can be drafted without losing their eligibility.47
Therefore, specific to baseball, the no-agent rule forces student-athletes to
toe the line between negotiating a contract and maintaining their
eligibility.48 The second unique situation, unlike basketball and football, is
that players can be drafted out of high school. This presents the unique
dilemma Andrew Oliver encountered.
Does a high school baseball player sign the professional contract, or
does he opt for college? And who helps make this decision? He can hire
an attorney with whom to discuss the proposed contract, but the attorney is
extremely limited in what he or she can do. As NCAA Bylaw 12.3.2.1
currently reads, an attorney, hired by an athlete to secure advice regarding a
professional sports contract, cannot even be in the same room with his client
when the professional sports organization is attempting to plead its case for
why the athlete should sign the contract.
As Professor Karcher has argued, “[i]f the NCAA seeks to protect
the amateur athlete, it would seemingly be in the athlete’s best interest to
have competent representation to deal with professional sports organizations
43

NCAA MANUAL, supra note 2, Bylaw 12.3.2, at 69 (Legal Counsel).
Id.
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 2, Bylaws 12.3.2–12.3.2.1, at 69.
46
Katie Thomas, Baseball Star Challenges N.C.A.A. Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2008, at D1
[hereinafter Star Challenges].
47
Letter from Rachel Newman Baker, Dir. of Agent, Gambling and Amateurism Activities, NCAA,
to Baseball Student-Athletes with Remaining Eligibility (Oct. 2, 2007) (on file with author) [hereinafter
NCAA’s MLB Draft Letter].
48
John Seewer, College Baseball Star Suing NCAA in Ohio Court, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 6,
2009.
44
45
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and the complex business and legal issues that surround the world of
professional sports.”49
In Oliver’s situation, his attorney placed a phone call to the
Minnesota Twins, who had drafted Andrew in the seventeenth round of the
2006 draft, and sat in on an in-house visit during which the Minnesota
Twins offered his client nearly $400,000.50 To recap, a high school player
who is drafted cannot have an attorney negotiate over hundreds of thousands
of dollars if he wishes to preserve his future collegiate eligibility while
deciding whether to sign the contract. Instead, only family members and the
athletes themselves can negotiate life-changing contracts with professional
organizations.51
In light of this rule, the 18-year-old Oliver, and his father, who is a
part-time truck driver, should have acted alone in negotiating the big money
contract with the Minnesota Twins.52 For many high school and college
players, the contract’s value is much more than $400,000, which creates
even more reason for a seasoned attorney to be involved in the negotiation
process.53 As can be imagined, Bylaw 12.3.2.1 is often violated. “‘Baseball
underestimates in general the magnitude of what kids are going through at
this age,’” said former major leaguer A. J. Hinch. “‘You’re 18 to 22 and
you’re talking about $7 million . . . .’”54 In turn, “‘[v]irtually every player
has an agent -- call them a lawyer, call them an advisor, there’s no
difference,’” a Major League Baseball executive told the New York Times
on condition of anonymity.55 Oliver’s Cleveland, Ohio, based attorney,
Richard Johnson, points to the bigger issue: “‘[The] idea that you can
restrain somebody’s right to counsel is preposterous . . . .’”56 The rule
forces an attorney to either go along with the NCAA regulation and abandon
his or her client at a critical time, or competently represent his or her client,
thereby running the risk of jeopardizing the student-athlete’s collegiate
eligibility.

49

Karcher, supra note 33, at 215.
Williams Letter to NCAA, supra note 16; Oliver Files Suit, supra note 17. Oliver turned down the
nearly $400,000 signing bonus, opting to pitch collegiately at Oklahoma State. Id.
51
The NCAA does allow institutions (if they wish) to create professional sports counseling panels to
help student-athletes already enrolled in college navigate the professional sports business. NCAA
MANUAL, supra note 2, Bylaws 12.3.4, at 69; see also Karcher, supra note 33, at 218-19. However, high
school players who are drafted, or anticipate being drafted, are not covered under this rule and do not
have access to these panels. Id. at 219.
52
Star Challenges, supra note 46.
53
Karcher, supra note 33, at 220.
54
Star Challenges, supra note 46.
55
Id.
56
Id.
50
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2. NCAA Bylaw 19.7 (Formerly 19.8)57
Under current NCAA rules, if a student-athlete successfully obtains
a restraining order or injunction against his or her institution or the NCAA
that is ultimately invalidated, the institution faces stiff penalties if it allowed
the student-athlete to participate in athletic competition as a result of the
initial restraining order or injunction.58 This is known as the “Restitution
57

19.7 Restitution
If a student-athlete who is ineligible under the terms of the constitution, bylaws or
other legislation of the Association is permitted to participate in intercollegiate
competition contrary to such NCAA legislation but in accordance with the terms
of a court restraining order or injunction operative against the institution attended
by such student-athlete or against the Association, or both, and said injunction is
voluntarily vacated, stayed or reversed or it is finally determined by the courts that
injunctive relief is not or was not justified, the Board of Directors may take any
one or more of the following actions against such institution in the interest of
restitution and fairness to competing institutions: (Revised: 11/1/07 effective
8/1/08)
(a) Require that individual records and performances achieved during participation
by such ineligible student-athlete shall be vacated or stricken;
(b) Require that team records and performances achieved during participation by
such ineligible student-athlete shall be vacated or stricken;
(c) Require that team victories achieved during participation by such ineligible
student-athlete shall be abrogated and the games or events forfeited to the
opposing institutions;
(d) Require that individual awards earned during participation by such ineligible
student-athlete shall be returned to the Association, the sponsor or the competing
institution supplying same;
(e) Require that team awards earned during participation by such ineligible
student-athlete shall be returned to the Association, the sponsor or the competing
institution supplying same;
(f) Determine that the institution is ineligible for one or more NCAA
championships in the sports and in the seasons in which such ineligible studentathlete participated;
(g) Determine that the institution is ineligible for invitational and postseason meets
and tournaments in the sports and in the seasons in which such ineligible studentathlete participated;
(h) Require that the institution shall remit to the NCAA the institution’s share of
television receipts (other than the portion shared with other conference members)
for appearing on any live television series or program if such ineligible studentathlete participates in the contest(s) selected for such telecast, or if the Leadership
Council concludes that the institution would not have been selected for such
telecast but for the participation of such ineligible student-athlete during the season
of the telecast; any such funds thus remitted shall be devoted to the NCAA
postgraduate scholarship program; and (Revised: 11/1/07 effective 8/1/08)
(i) Require that the institution that has been represented in an NCAA
championship by such a student-athlete shall be assessed a financial penalty as
determined by the Committee on Infractions. (Revised: 4/26/01 effective 8/1/01)
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 2, Bylaw 19.7, at 302.
Id.

58
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Rule.”59
Injunctions are important in the student-athlete context. Due to the
short career of college athletes in general, an injunction is often the only
effective remedy an athlete can have.60 However, even if a student-athlete
obtains an injunction, effectively reinstating his or her eligibility, institutions
are still weary of retribution should the court order ultimately be found
unenforceable; and for good reason. The penalties are vast and harsh. Team
records can be vacated, championship trophies rescinded, money taken away
(in the form of television receipts), and monetary penalties imposed.61 With
such forceful teeth, it is easy to see why the NCAA poses a tough
challenge—not only to student-athletes, but to member institutions as well.62
It can leave institutions with the choice of honoring a student-athlete’s initial
legal rights (i.e., an injunction) or refusing to recognize the court order,
thereby preserving its athletic teams’ future status should the injunctive
rights be found unenforceable by a higher court.
Some have opined that the Restitution Rule itself pushes courts
toward ignoring a student-athlete’s legal rights (i.e., granting an injunction)
because of the fear that more harm could be placed upon the institution if
the injunction were to be overruled by a higher court.63 Hence, the reason
one writer has called the Restitution Rule the “NCAA’s Big Stick.”64
B. It’s More than Balls and Strikes
“Courts have wrongly deferred to the amateurism bylaws and to the
NCAA’s definition of the product of intercollegiate athletics. The NCAA’s
claim of the need to promote amateurism is merely a pretense; the NCAA
bylaws themselves do not adhere to a pure notion of amateurism . . . .”
—Anonymous, Harvard Law Review65

59
Id. For a more in-depth discussion on the Restitution Rule, see Gordon E. Gouevia, Making a
Mountain out of a Mogul: Jeremy Bloom v. NCAA and the Unjustified Denial of Compensation Under
NCAA Amateurism Rules, 6 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 22 (2003); See also Alain Lapter, Bloom v.
NCAA: A Procedural Due Process Analysis and the Need for Reform, 12 SPORTS LAW. J. 255, 268-69
(2005).
60
Lapter, supra note 59, at 268.
61
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 2, Bylaw 19.7, at 302 (§§ 19.7(b)-(e), (h), (i)).
62
Gouevia, supra note 59, at 24 (“[T]he potential for such severe sanctions under Bylaw 19.8
discourages institutions from adhering to injunctions against the NCAA, and, as [Jeremy] Bloom’s case
has revealed, may discourage courts from issuing injunctions against an institution at all.”).
63
Id.
64
Lapter, supra note 59, at 268-69.
65
Note, supra note 41, at 1318 (explaining why NCAA rules should be given a “meaningful rule of
reason analysis” to invalidate those regulations that equate to an unreasonable restraint of trade).
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1. Judicial Deference
It is not easy to sue the NCAA. The organization fights at every
legal twist and turn, spending major money to defend its regulations.66
Many times, it is even harder to win. For years, courts have provided
judicial deference to NCAA rules, despite numerous attacks upon the
regulations in the NCAA’s 427-page manual. Two of the main attacks have
been in the way of due process67 and antitrust challenges.68 However, these
have been unsuccessful. In NCAA v. Tarkanian, the United States Supreme
Court held that the NCAA need not provide constitutional due process
protections because NCAA rules do not invoke state action.69 Attempts by
states to regulate the NCAA have failed in the name of infringing upon
interstate commerce.70 And the NCAA’s perceived advancement of
amateurism has allowed it to avoid liability for its bylaws regarding limited
compensation.71 Despite small victories against the NCAA—courts have
struck down regulations that restricted television plans, coaches’ earnings,
and participation in tournaments72—courts have provided judicial deference
to the NCAA over the years in the name of concepts such as private
association and amateurism.73
In fact, the NCAA’s no-agent rule is no stranger to litigation. It has
been upheld on the premise that the no-agent rule does not have an
anticompetitive effect and is in furtherance of the idea of amateurism. In
Banks v. NCAA, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned as follows:

66
Christian Dennie, White Out Full Grant-in-Aid: An Antitrust Action the NCAA Cannot Afford to
Lose, 7 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 97, 109 (2007).
67
Mitten & Davis, supra note 21, at 125.
68
See generally Note, supra note 41.
69
NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 199 (1988); see also Lockhart, supra note 3, at 129
(describing Tarkanian as the NCAA’s “legal anchor”). However,

[i[n January, 2007, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit court
held, in Cohane v. NCAA, that the NCAA could be deemed a state actor if
allegations in a coach's complaint were proven that a state university colluded with
and effected the resignation of the coach in order to ‘placate the NCAA.’ The
Supreme Court denied certiorari. The Second Circuit in Cohane distinguished
Tarkanian on the narrow ground that in Tarkanian the public university and the
NCAA acted more like adversaries than joint participants in the coach's
suspension.
See Kadence A. Otto and Krisal S. Stippich, Revisiting Tarkanian: The Entwinement and
Interdependence of the NCAA and State Universities and Colleges 20 Years Later, 18 J. LEGAL ASPECTS
SPORTS 243, 244-245 (2008) (citing Cohane v. NCAA, 215 Fed. Appx. 13 (2d Cir. 2007)).
70
NCAA v. Miller, 10 F.3d 633, 638 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Gary R. Roberts, Resolution of
Disputes in Intercollegiate Athletics, 35 VAL. U. L. REV. 431, 433-434 (2001).
71
NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984). The Supreme Court
upheld the NCAA’s limited compensation bylaw, in light of anti-trust laws, because it advanced
amateurism. Id.; see also Note, supra note 41, at 1301.
72
Dennie, supra note 66, at 110 nn. 95-97 (describing a series of cases in which courts found certain
NCAA regulations violated the Sherman Antitrust Act as unreasonable restraints on trade).
73
Mitten & Davis, supra note 21, at 120.
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The involvement of sports agents in NCAA football would
turn amateur intercollegiate athletics into a sham because
the focus of college football would shift from educating the
student-athlete to creating a ‘minor league’ farm system out
of college football that would operate solely to improve
players’ skills for professional football in the NFL.74
Furthermore, the court stated that the no-agent rule is “vital and
must work in conjunction with other eligibility requirements to preserve the
amateur status of college athletics, and prevent the sports agents from
further intruding into the collegiate educational system.”75 Thus, the
Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff in Banks, a former college football
player, did not establish that the no-agent rule had an anticompetitive effect
punishable by law.
Tying bylaws to the idea of amateurism seemingly has given the
NCAA a get out of jail free card, as “[d]eference to the NCAA’s amateurism
policy has become the norm for courts hearing challenges of NCAA
regulations.”76 Part of the reason for the deference is the basic idea that
courts shy away from interfering with private voluntary entities, as long as
the actions do not “infringe on a personal liberty or property right and are
[not] illegal or fraudulent.”77 For instance, under Florida law, a court will
not inject itself into the internal affairs of a private organization absent
extraordinary circumstances.78 As Matthew Mitten and Timothy Davis
wrote in the Virginia Sports and Entertainment Law Journal, “[d]eference
premised on the law of private associations is particularly troublesome.”79
However, the private association rationale is a red herring in the context of
the NCAA and student-athletes, as the rule of deference applies to members,
which the student-athletes are not.
In effect, student-athletes are seemingly regulated by a nongovernmental body of which they are not members. Yet, claims by them are
overlooked in favor of deference to the private association. Providing such
deference, in light of the NCAA’s “increased level of commercialism,”
unjustifiably deteriorates meritorious challenges to NCAA regulations.80 In
fact, questions remain whether the NCAA’s goal is really to protect its
amateur image. While college athletes are prohibited from receiving
benefits, other than scholarships, in the name of amateurism, the NCAA and
74

Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1091 (7th Cir. 1992).
Id.
Gouevia, supra note 59, at 26.
77
Mitten & Davis, supra note 21, at 120.
78
NCAA v. Brinkworth, 680 So. 2d 1081, 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
79
Mitten & Davis, supra note 21, at 128.
80
Gouevia, supra note 59, at 26; see also Brian Davidson, Pushing the Limits?, NATIONAL
COLLEGIATE SCOUTING ASSOCIATION, April 6, 2009, http://blog.ncsasports.org/2009/04/06/pushing-thelimits/.
75
76
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member institutions make millions off players’ computer-generated
likenesses in video games.81 In 2009 alone, the NCAA men’s basketball
tournament generated $591 million in television and marketing revenue.82
As the late NCAA President Myles Brand said recently:
“There’s nothing wrong with being a business like one of
the professional leagues. They’re very good at what they
do. But we have additional constraints. We’re in the
college milieu, and those who play for us are not
professional athletes.
Having said that, I think we can look for and find ways to
increase our revenue streams.”83
These staggering comments and figures lead back to the passage
from the Harvard Law Review presented at the beginning of this section:
“Courts have wrongly deferred to the amateurism bylaws and to the
NCAA’s definition of the product of intercollegiate athletics. The NCAA’s
claim of the need to promote amateurism is merely a pretense; the NCAA
bylaws themselves do not adhere to a pure notion of amateurism . . . .”84
2. Contractual Curveball
By now, it is clear that courts provide judicial deference to the
NCAA based on its private association status and its goal of amateurism.
Most legal theories and challenges to NCAA bylaws have failed. However,
as Mitten and Davis have pointed out, one possible avenue for convincing
courts to look more closely at private organizations is contract law’s
arbitrary and capricious exception.85 To pursue a claim against the NCAA
on the grounds that a particular regulation is arbitrary and capricious, a
student-athlete must first establish standing. To get standing, a court must
81
A former college football player filed a class action lawsuit against the NCAA and EA Sports,
“claiming they’ve gone too far in using the likenesses of college players who are prohibited from sharing
in the games’ profits.” EA Sports produces a college football and basketball video game each year that
features college athletes, right down to their height, weight, number, skin color and hometown. The
players are not given names on the games, but consumers can name the players manually or download
rosters created by other consumers. In 2008, the NCAA Football game sold around 2.5 million copies.
Steve Wieberg, Suit Targets NCAA Athletes’ Likenesses in Video Games, USA TODAY, May 8, 2009, at
C1; see generally Complaint, Keller v. Electronic Arts, Inc., No. CV-09-1967 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2009),
available at http://www.courthousenews.com/2009/05/06/ElectronicArts.pdf.
82
Steve Wieberg & Steve Berkowitz, Has College Sports Marketing Gone Too Far?: Casino Ads,
Video Deals Reflect Urgent Push for Revenue, USA TODAY, Apr. 2, 2009, at 1A.
83
Id.
84
Note, supra note 41, at 1318. For a more in depth discussion of the NCAA’s “Veil of
Amateurism,” see Amy Christian McCormick & Robert A. McCormick, The Emperor’s New Clothes:
Lifting the NCAA’s Veil of Amateurism, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 495 (2008).
85
Mitten & Davis, supra note 21, at 121. The authors discuss the arbitrary and capricious exception,
but they write that recent case law (prior to Oliver) “illustrate[s] that the arbitrary and capricious standard
does not provide an effective measure of legal protection to student-athletes in eligibility disputes or
appropriately limit the extreme deference courts afford the NCAA.” Id. Another important exception
appears to be the public policy argument, which was argued heavily in Oliver v. NCAA.
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accept that the student-athlete is a third-party beneficiary of the membership
contract between the NCAA and the student-athlete’s institution.86 This is
based on an argument that the NCAA’s constitution, bylaws, and regulations
are intended to benefit student-athletes.87 If a court accepts such an
argument, then the student-athlete has standing to pursue a claim that the
NCAA acts arbitrarily and capriciously in “applying its eligibility rules by
breaching the duty of good faith and fair dealing implied into every
contract.”88 Therefore, a student-athlete first has to establish a third-party
contractual relationship with the NCAA and then must show that the
regulation violates the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing required
in every contract to effectively rely on the arbitrary and capricious
exception.
The court in Oliver v. NCAA was not the first to accept the thirdparty contract analysis. In Bloom v. NCAA,89 Jeremy Bloom, a former
University of Colorado football player, used the third-party contract
rationale to argue an NCAA rule that prohibited Bloom, also a professional
skier, from entering into endorsement deals was arbitrary and capricious and
therefore void.90 Bloom was a high school football star who was recruited
by the University of Colorado. Prior to enrolling, he participated in the
Olympics and ultimately became the World Cup champion in freestyle
moguls.
As a result, he secured “various paid entertainment
opportunities.”91

86

Id. at 122 (citing Bloom v. NCAA, 93 P.3d 621 (Colo. App. 2004)).
Bloom, 93 P.3d at 623-24.
Mitten & Davis, supra note 21, at 122.
89
Bloom, 93 P.3d at 621.
90
Mitten & Davis, supra note 21, at 122 (citing Bloom, 93 P.3d at 623-24). “NCAA bylaws prohibit
every student-athlete from receiving money for advertisements and endorsements.” Bloom, 93 P.3d at
625. A professional athlete in one sport can participate as a collegiate athlete in a different collegiate
sport as long as he or she does not receive money for advertisements and endorsements. However, many
professional athletes in sports like skiing, golf, tennis, and boxing receive a great portion of their income
from sponsors. Id.
As the Bloom court stated:
87
88

In our view, when read together, the NCAA bylaws express a clear and
unambiguous intent to prohibit student-athletes from engaging in endorsements
and paid media appearances, without regard to: (1) when the opportunity for such
activities originated; (2) whether the opportunity arose or exists for reasons
unrelated to participation in an amateur sport; and (3) whether income derived
from the opportunity is customary for any particular professional sport.
The clear import of the bylaws is that, although student-athletes have
the right to be professional athletes, they do not have the right to simultaneously
engage in endorsement or paid media activity and maintain their eligibility to
participate in amateur competition. And we may not disregard the clear meaning
of the bylaws simply because they may disproportionately affect those who
participate in individual professional sports.
Id. at 626.
Bloom, 93 P.3d at 622.

91
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Because of these endorsement deals, Bloom’s amateur status as a
college football player was compromised, and his college football career
was cut short. While the court accepted Bloom’s third-party beneficiary
argument, it held that the no-endorsement rule was “rationally related to a
legitimate purpose -- maintaining a line of demarcation between college and
professional sports.”92 To be clear, Bloom was attempting to participate in
collegiate football after successfully securing endorsement deals as a
professional skier. By accepting endorsement deals as a skier, Bloom
somehow compromised his amateur status as a collegiate football player.
Not allowing a student-athlete to collect endorsement deals
undoubtedly maintains a line of demarcation between collegiate and
professional sports. However, that line of reasoning only logically stretches
to the sport in which the athlete wishes to participate as a collegiate athlete.
Bloom, a professional skier,93 only wished to participate as an amateur
collegiate football player, a sport in which he had yet to earn a dime.
In light of the Bloom ruling in Colorado, it was conceivable to
expect the Common Pleas Court of Erie County, Ohio, to defer to the
NCAA’s amateurism argument when it was presented with the question of
whether Bylaw 12.3.2.1—which prohibits an attorney, who is legally
retained under NCAA bylaws to review a professional contract, from
actually being present during negotiations of the contract—is at odds with
the concept of amateurism?
i. Step One—Alleging a Contractual Wrong
The Bloom decision, although decided in favor of the NCAA,
presented opportunities for cases like Oliver v. NCAA to be meaningfully
heard because of its recognition that student-athletes have standing to
challenge NCAA regulations through a third-party contract analysis.
Andy Oliver did just that, challenging the NCAA’s no-agent and
restitution rules as arbitrary, capricious, and against public policy.94
Working in Oliver’s favor was the fact that Bylaw 12.3.2.1 purportedly
regulated the conduct of attorneys, which Oliver argued belongs exclusively
to the states. In his complaint, Oliver alleged that 12.3.2.1 was against
public policy because the NCAA and Oklahoma State “have absolutely no
authority whatsoever to promulgate a rule that would prevent a lawyer—
legally retained under the NCAA’s bylaws—from competently or zealously
representing his or her client.”95 Additionally, Oliver alleged 12.3.2.1 was
arbitrary and capricious because it “limits the player’s ability to effectively
92
93
94
95

Mitten & Davis, supra note 21, at 123 (citing Bloom, 93 P.3d at 626-27).
Professional skiers earn most of their living from endorsements. See Bloom, 93 P.3d at 623-24.
See Oliver Complaint, supra note 14, ¶¶ 69, 71, 74.
Id. ¶ 96A.
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negotiate a contract that the Defendant NCAA allows the player to
negotiate.”96 In essence, Oliver points to the logical holes in the NCAA’s
amateurism claims. On one hand, it allows an attorney to review proposed
professional contracts, but on the other hand, it prohibits the attorney from
negotiating a contract that a student-athlete has every right to negotiate himor herself without compromising his or her collegiate eligibility.
In regard to Bylaw 19.7, the Restitution Rule, Oliver argued it
“illegally interferes with the Ohio Constitution’s delegation of all judicial
power to the Courts of this State, and it exists solely to coerce or direct its
agents and members to ignore court orders that are binding upon them as
members of the Defendant NCAA . . . .”97 Once the contractual harm is
clear, the focus shifts to establishing a contractual relationship.
ii. Step Two—Establishing a Contractual Relationship
As in Bloom, Oliver needed standing to bring such a contract claim.
Predictably, the NCAA argued Oliver had no standing to argue a contract
claim because he was not a party to any contract with the NCAA. However,
the court sided with Oliver, finding he was an intended third-party
beneficiary between the NCAA and Oklahoma State’s contract for
membership.
Whether the basic rudiments of a contractual relationship
were formed from [the National Letter of Intent] is
questionable, but the court finds that a contractual
relationship does exist. How? A contractual relationship
was formed by the plaintiff’s status as an intended thirdparty beneficiary between the NCAA and OSU. The
plaintiff, who is not a party to the contract between the
NCAA and OSU, stands to benefit from the contract’s
performance, and thus he acquires rights under the contract
as well as the ability to enforce the contract once those
rights have vested.98
Under Ohio law, the court reasoned, “an intended third-party
beneficiary has enforceable rights under the contract only when the
contracting parties expressly intend that a third party should benefit from the
contract.”99 The court found that duties were owed by the promisee and the
promisor “by way of the contractual agreements within the manual . . . .”100

96
97
98
99
100
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Id. ¶ 96B.
Id. ¶ 97A.
Oliver v. NCAA, 920 N.E.2d 196, 200 (Ohio Ct. Comm. Pl. 2008).
Oliver, 920 N.E.2d 203, 211 (Ohio Ct. Comm. Pl. 2009).
Id. at 211.
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iii. Step Three—Framing the Conflict
Once standing was established, it was up to Oliver’s attorney to
convince the court that Bylaws 12.3.2.1 and 19.7 violated the duty of good
faith and fair dealing implied in contracts. At this stage, it is important to
frame the conflict in a manner as to show how the NCAA bylaw at issue
does not further the idea of amateurism. Bloom failed at this stage because
the court rejected the argument that accepting endorsement deals in a totally
different sport than the one the collegiate athlete participates in at a member
institution did not conflict with the NCAA’s goal of maintaining a clear line
of demarcation between college and professional sports.101
When framing the conflict, it is important to understand that the
court is not in a position to rewrite the bylaws. Nor is it supposed to agree
or disagree with the bylaws in question.102 The job of the court is to decide
whether a party has violated its implied duty of good faith and fair dealing
within the contract.
NCAA Bylaw 12.3.2.1 provides:
A lawyer may not be present during discussions of a
contract offer with a professional organization or have any
direct contact (in person, by telephone or by mail) with a
professional sports organization on behalf of the individual.
A lawyer’s presence during such discussions is considered
representation by an agent.103
Here, the NCAA clung to its amateurism claim, arguing Bylaw 12.3.2.1
helped retain the line of demarcation between college and professional
sports and that the public is not served when courts intervene upon the
internal affairs of private associations.104
The Oliver court did not agree with this often-used argument by the
NCAA, however. In addition to taking issue with the fact that there was
clear evidence the rule was selectively enforced,105 the trial judge peered
through the NCAA’s veil of amateurism:
These rules attempt to say to the student-athlete that they
can consult with an attorney [Bylaw 12.3.2] but that
attorney cannot negotiate a contract for them with a
professional sport’s team [Bylaw 12.3.2.1]. This surely does
not retain a clear line of demarcation between amateurism
and professionalism.
101
102
103
104
105

Bloom, 93 P.3d at 626-27.
Oliver, 920 N.E.2d at 212.
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 2, Bylaw 12.3.2.1, at 69.
Oliver, 920 N.E.2d at 208.
Id.; see also Star Challenges, supra note 46 (indicating that Bylaw 12.3.2.1 is broken all the time).
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Was Barratta’s presence in that room a clear indication
that the Plaintiff, a teenager who had admitted at trial that
he was in no position to negotiate a professional contract
and whose father testified to the same, was a
professional?106
Instead of deferring to the private organization, Judge Tone of the
Common Pleas Court of Erie County, Ohio, pondered the true applicability
of such a rule prohibiting attorneys from negotiating contracts:
For a student-athlete to be permitted to have an attorney and
then to tell that student athlete that his attorney cannot be
present during the discussion of an offer from a professional
organization, is akin to a patient hiring a doctor but the
doctor is told by the hospital board and the insurance
company that he (the doctor) cannot be present when the
patient meets with a surgeon because the conference may
improve his patients decision-making power.107
Bylaw 12.3.2.1 also presented “what-ifs” for the court:
What occurs if the parents of a student are attorneys or for
that matter sports agents? What would have happened if
Tim Baratta had been in the kitchen or outside or on the
patio instead of in the same room as his client when the
offer from the Minnesota Twins was made to Plaintiff?108
Does the fact that his attorney was technically “present,” instead of sitting
on the front porch at the time of the negotiations, mean that Oliver crossed
the line of amateurism? As the court reasoned:
If the [NCAA] intends to deal with this athlete or any
athlete in good faith, the student-athlete should have the
opportunity to have the tools present (in this case an
attorney) that would allow him to make a wise decision
without automatically being deemed a professional,
especially when such contractual negotiations can be
overwhelming, even to those who are skilled in their
implementation.109
As such, the court found Bylaw 12.3.2.1 to be “unreliable (capricious) and
illogical (arbitrary) and indeed stifl[ing] what attorneys are trained and
retained to do.”110
106
107
108
109
110
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Id.
Id. at 214-215.
Id. at 215.
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The court had even less trouble declaring Bylaw 19.7
unenforceable. Under 19.7, if a student-athlete successfully obtains a
restraining order or injunction against his or her institution or the NCAA
that is ultimately invalidated, the institution faces stiff penalties if it allowed
the student-athlete to participate in athletic competition as a result of the
initial restraining order or injunction.111 In the view of the court, this type of
bylaw is overreaching.
Just because member institutions agree to a rule or bylaw
does not mean that said bylaw is sacrosanct or that it is not
arbitrary and/or capricious.
. . . The old adage that you can put lipstick on a pig but it is
still a pig is quite relevant here. The Defendant may entitle
Bylaw 19.7 “Restitution” but it is still “punitive” in its
achievement and it fosters a direct attack on the
constitutional right of access to courts.112
This right to access courts is embodied in the questions Bylaw 19.7 leaves
institutions to ponder—Do they obey the court or the NCAA?
Does the institution allow the student-athlete to play as
directed by the Court’s ruling and in so doing face great
harm should the decision be reversed on appeal?
Alternatively, does the institution, in fear of Bylaw 19.7,
decide that it is safer to disregard the Court Order and not
allow the student athlete to play thereby finding itself in
contempt of court? Such a bylaw is governed by no fixed
standard except that which is self-serving for the Defendant.
To that extent, it is arbitrary and indeed a violation of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing implicit in its
contract with Plaintiff as the third party beneficiary.113
Such a ruling was refreshingly unique, as the Restitution Rule has
been used by courts as a reason to deny student-athletes injunctions in the
first place because of the potential for great harm to occur to the institution
should the injunction be overturned by a higher court.114 In Bloom v. NCAA,
the judge “determined Bloom had not demonstrated that the issuance of an
injunction would serve the public interest because the NCAA’s ability to
regulate student-athletes would be impaired and [the university] could
potentially face sanctions under the Restitution Rule . . . .”115 This, one
commentator suggests, is a prime “example of the court’s historical
111
112
113
114
115

NCAA MANUAL, supra note 2, Bylaw 19.7, at 302.
Oliver, 920 N.E.2d at 215-216.
Id. at 216.
Gouevia, supra note 59, at 27 (discussing Bloom).
Id.
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deference to the NCAA.”116
The hope now, following the reasoning of the now-vacated Oliver v.
NCAA decision, is that courts will begin “legitimately considering the merits
of the legal challenge[s]”117 brought before them by student-athletes
challenging NCAA bylaws. This can only be achieved if the court is willing
to legitimately consider and analyze whether the NCAA bylaws in question
really do further the idea of amateurism or whether they merely operate in a
fashion as to avoid the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing bestowed
upon the NCAA.
IV. WHAT’S NEXT?
“Oliver case frees college players to use agents”
—ESPN blog headline118
Headlines like these cause concern.119 Did the Oliver v. NCAA
decision give student-athletes a universal pass to use agents? Not exactly—
neither before nor after the settlement. Truthfully, no one knows exactly
what the Oliver decision will bring because it was the first of its kind.
One thing is for sure, however. The ruling gave the NCAA 750,000
reasons to settle the case so the Court could quickly vacate the Order.120
Before the settlement, the NCAA was publicly staying quiet121 and
compliance departments at NCAA universities continued to “urg[e] their
student-athletes to proceed with caution since the situation is so murky.”122
116

Id.
Id.
118
Keith Law Blog, Oliver Case Frees College Players to Use Agents, http://sports.espn.go.com/
espn/blog/index?entryID=3911973&name=law_keith (Feb. 16, 2009 19:37 EST).
119
Mr. Law’s headline is misleading, as the Oliver decision did not give athletes a universal free pass
to use agents. However, his blog entry is somewhat more on point: “The ruling puts an end -- at least for
the moment -- to the farcical NCAA rule that prohibited players from using agents to negotiate on their
behalf with major league teams, even after they had been drafted.” Id. Although, even if a settlement
had not been reached, it is unclear whether non-attorney agents could negotiate these contracts.
117

120

“Within this landscape it remains to be seen whether there is a potential plaintiff
sitting on a metaphorical legal bench who cannot be induced to play the NCAA
settlement game. Most of the business-related cases against the NCAA have been
settled because plaintiffs have had vested financial interest in settling rather than
engaging in protracted legal battles whose outcomes were not assured. However, if
this potential plaintiff does not need to protect a future career and is already
financially secure, then the NCAA may be unable to hold the ball indefinitely.”
Fitness Information Technology, http://fitinfotech.wordpress.com/2009/12/04/ncaa-wins-in-longrun-with-legal-settlements/ (Dec. 4, 2009, 16:22 EST) (quoting Mark Nagel and Richard Southall in the
SportsBusiness Journal).
121
Liz Mullen, NCAA Quiet on Immediate Effect of Ruling in Andy Oliver Case, STREET & SMITH’S
SPORTSBUSINESS JOURNAL, Mar. 9, 2009, at 12, available at http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/
article/61798 [hereinafter NCAA Quiet].
122
NCAA Compliance Blog, http://ncaacompliance.wordpress.com/2009/04/06/andy-oliver-v-ncaaupdate/ (Apr. 6, 2009).
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In legal briefings, the NCAA was chomping at the bit to be heard. “These
bylaws, adopted by and critical to orderly functioning of some 1,200 NCAA
member institutions and directly affecting 380,000 student-athletes, have
now been—at a minimum—set at disarray by the ill-considered, extra
jurisdictional ruling of a lone Common Pleas Court.”123 Now that the case
has been settled and the decision vacated, the NCAA is enforcing “‘the
bylaw as appropriate, as the bylaw never changed . . . .’”124 Andrew Oliver
is moving on as well; he is currently pitching in the Detroit Tigers minor
league system.125 But many believe this case is bigger than one person.
“‘He gets his life back,’”126 Oliver’s attorney told the New York
Times. “‘And for the 360,000 student-athletes in the N.C.A.A., it’s the tip
of the iceberg that they actually have legal rights.’”127 Before the settlement
was reached, one baseball agent said the decision, if it held up, would
“‘validate the existing practice in the industry,’” and lawyers will now be
able to negotiate contracts of major league draft picks.128
But what exactly will happen?
One not so optimistic observer believed the ruling, even if it would
have been upheld and not vacated, would only apply to student-athletes who
either attend school in Ohio or are Ohio residents like Oliver.129 An
argument existed that the decision had no implications outside of Erie
County, Ohio, where the Oliver v. NCAA case was heard.130 Judge Tone,
however, disagreed. In May 2009, he attempted to clear up any confusion
the permanent injunction order might have created:
Contrary to Defendant's rhetoric, the February entry did not
presume to void an NCAA rule, it did void an NCAA rule. In that respect,
discussions of how to proceed without Bylaw 12.3.2.1 should be discussed
by the NCAA and its member institutions. Make no mistake, however, that
wherever the NCAA is located, the ruling of this Court should be currently
maintained and Bylaw 12.3.2.1 is void, not presumed void, until and unless
an appellate review would determine otherwise.131
123

NCAA’s Opposition, supra note 25, at 1 (emphasis added).
Still Enforce Rule, supra note 23.
Jason Beck, Oliver Gets Past Rough Start in AFL, MLB.COM, Oct. 23, 2009, http://mlb.mlb.
com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20091023&content_id=7536980&vkey=news_det&fext=.jsp&c_id=det.
126
Alan Schwarz, N.C.A.A. Can’t Ban Lawyers for Athletes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2009, at B11.
127
Id.
128
NCAA Quiet, supra note 121.
129
JETLaw Blog, Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law, http://jetl.wordpress.com/
2009/04/05/the-ncaa-strikes-out-but-only-in-ohio/ (Apr. 5, 2009, 20:56 EST) (describing the view of
Dean of Indiana University School of Law, Gary Roberts). Although the NCAA itself has asked the
question “will the Order effect [sic] ‘Ohio members, Oklahoma members, all institutions?’” NCAA’s
Opposition, supra note 25, at 11.
130
NCAA Compliance Blog, supra note 122 (“[I]t is unclear how far-reaching this decision is since
the ruling . . . . will apply only to students who live or play college baseball in Ohio, while others believe
this case will set precedent that other courts could follow should a legal challenge arise.”).
131
Contempt Order, supra note 26, at 2 (citation omitted).
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Even though the decision has now been vacated by the settlement,
this wide-sweeping proclamation by Judge Tone indicates that Oliver v.
NCAA could be strike one to the NCAA’s no-agent rules.132 Oliver’s
attorney, Richard Johnson, believes the NCAA “‘will lose 100 out of 100 of
any such future lawsuits over this rule, since no court is going to allow the
NCAA to regulate lawyers or prohibit nonmember student athletes from
retaining counsel.’”133
However, it is unlikely this case, by itself, will open the floodgates
for all collegiate athletes, regardless of sport, to obtain agents. Baseball is
arguably the only major college sport that is implicated by the main NCAA
bylaw at issue in Oliver, Bylaw 12.3.2.1, because baseball players can be
drafted and presented with professional contracts without losing their
eligibility under NCAA rules.134
The admirable line of demarcation can be seen in rules governing
benefits received by student-athletes, and even by some rules protecting
athletes from agents. However, as Judge Tone correctly noted, allowing a
person to hire an attorney to review a contract, but prohibiting that same
attorney from negotiating that contract on behalf of the student-athlete, does
not further any of the NCAA’s alleged interests. In fact, while trying to
protect the athletes, the NCAA is actually hindering them.
Simply permitting a student-athlete to retain competent
representation to contact professional clubs and to advocate on his behalf to
obtain a result that is in his own best interests, financially and otherwise,
would not destroy the line of demarcation any more than allowing the
student-athlete or the professional sports counseling panel to engage in the
same conduct.135
The Major League Baseball Players Association issued a statement
through its general counsel, stating it “‘believes that all individuals dealing
132
See MLPBA Warns NCAA, supra note 28. In fact, expect more lawsuits to arise in the future, as
the NCAA is sending out questionnaires to student-athletes that were selected in the June Major League
Baseball draft asking if their advisers had direct communication with Major League Baseball teams.
Reading between the lines, the NCAA is trying to nail student-athletes with violations of the no-agent
rule. Oliver’s attorney is receiving phone calls from parents around the nation regarding these
questionnaires. Id.
133
Still Enforce Rule, supra note 23. Oliver’s attorney is not alone in his post-settlement assessment
of NCAA bylaws at issue. “‘The regulation is as improper now as it was when the judge found it to be a
violation of state law,” attorney David Cornwell said. Id.
134
Although it is conceivable that this same situation could occur in the high school basketball
setting if a player is deciding between a contract offer to play professionally overseas for a year before
entering the NBA draft and a scholarship offer to play in college. If a lawyer negotiated a contract for
the athlete to play professionally overseas, but ultimately the player decided instead to go to college, the
player might run into a situation in which the NCAA determines he has compromised his amateur status
under Bylaw 12.3.2.1.
135
Karcher, supra note 33, at 223. Karcher points out that NCAA rules already allow for the player
and a professional sports counseling panel (if the university elects to form such a panel) to negotiate a
professional sports contract. High school players are left to negotiate the contract themselves, as they do
not have access to these sports counseling panels. Id. at 224.
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with professional sports franchises should have access to representation.
We hope the Oliver case furthers that goal.’”136
However, Oliver v. NCAA is bigger than whether an attorney can be
used to negotiate a professional sports contract without student-athletes
compromising their eligibility. The most important aspect of Oliver v.
NCAA is that the court took the time to truly analyze all the aspects of the
case. This case could “‘begin[] to establish precedent’” for future
challenges by student-athletes.137 In light of the question posed by Richard
Karcher in 2005 (“When looking at these regulations, the unavoidable
question arises: who is the NCAA trying to protect?”),138 the court refused
the proverbial punt that all too often occurs when student-athletes challenge
NCAA regulations. Instead, it poked holes in the NCAA’s veil that these
regulations “retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate
athletics and professional sports.”139 The third-party contractual analysis
finally allows student-athletes in situations like those of Andrew Oliver and
Jeremy Bloom to put NCAA regulations in front of courts. The reasoning
Judge Tone advanced gives courts the framework and opportunity to
consider if these rules truly align with the NCAA’s goal of amateurism or if
they are arbitrary and capricious regulations aimed only at controlling
student-athletes for no justifiable reason. Reform must start somewhere,
even if that somewhere is a Common Pleas Court in Erie County, Ohio.
Now that an Ohio court has called the NCAA’s bluff, the hope
exists that Oliver v. NCAA will be the line of demarcation between courts
that provide judicial deference to the NCAA and those who finally peer into
arbitrary NCAA regulations hidden behind the veil of amateurism.140 Only
then can the student-athlete truly be protected; a goal the NCAA, the
universities, and the student-athletes should strive for in unison.
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Still Enforce Rule, supra note 23.
JetLaw Blog, supra note 129 (quoting Karcher).
138
Karcher, supra note 33, at 215.
139
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 2, Const. art. 1.3.1, at 1.
140
See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 84 (exposing the NCAA’s claim of amateurism in
light of the big business it has happily become); see also Note, supra note 41, at 1318 (observation in
Harvard Law Review that the “NCAA’s claim of the need to promote amateurism is merely a pretense;
the NCAA bylaws themselves do not adhere to a pure notion of amateurism”).
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Author Note: This Article was originally written before the parties reached a settlement. It was modified
following the settlement. Since that time, two articles have been published regarding certain aspects of
Oliver v. NCAA. Because of time constraints, these articles have not been incorporated into this Article.
However, these articles can be found at James Halt, Andy Oliver Strikes Out the NCAA’s “No-Agent”
Rule for College Baseball, 19 J. Legal Aspects of Sport 185 (2009) and Virginia A. Fitt, The NCAA’s
Lost Cause and the Legal Ease of Redefining Amateurism, 59 Duke L.J. 555 (2009).
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